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1. Values and Methods
Recently, a heated discussion with some friends came round to the 
"universality" of the democratic method and to its validity for constructing 
a society of free and equal human beings. We asked ourselves first and 
foremost whether a universal validity could be attributed to particular 
values. (We gave "universality" the sense not so much of validity "for all 
times and all places" as of "universalizability" or "universal 
acceptability"). And since we all answered yes, someone posited as chief 
among those "universal" values the democratic method; which, it was said, 
gave us, among other things, a reliable yardstick for any political or social 
system. This is the point on which I wish to start by concentrating my 
readers' attention.
"Universality" can be attributed to values. These are "strong ideas": 
freedom is a value; so is equality. I call "value" everything aimed at 
guiding man's behaviour and statable in universalizable rules, where 
universalizability should be interpreted as the possibility of finding 
consensus among all those involved in an ideal discursive situation 
(characterized by equal dignity, impartiality and freedom of the subjects). 
The democratic method - if understood as a mechanism for representing 
wills and interests and as a means for reaching binding decisions - is more 
a tool for applying and realizing values and principles, among which an 
important place must go to freedom. Freedom (an ethical principle, or 
"value") would thus be achieved through using the democratic method. 
The democratic method may thus be conceived as the outcome of 
adherence to universalizable principles, not as one of those principles. One 




























































































freedom" in the same terms as that has been said of constitutionalism, or of 
the constitutional political system.
There seems to be the same separation between freedom and 
democratic method as between ethics and politics1. This distinction was 
noted by the liberal theorists themselves, who did not call their State 
"moral" or "ethical", but a "State based on the rule of law". While the so- 
called "ethical State" embodies in itself justice and the highest moral 
values, so that the State's activity becomes intrinsically just (the State 
becomes an end in itself, indeed, the end par excellence), in the State based 
on the rule of law the two spheres of ethics and politics remain quite 
distinct, and the State becomes one of the means for realizing those values 
that have their natural locus (for expression and realization) in civil 
society, and in the last instance in the consciousness of each individual. 
Adopting a distinction recently proposed by John Rawls, we might perhaps 
add that the democratic method is the expression of a "political 
conception", but not of a "comprehensive theory" bound up with a 
substantive conception of the good and of morality2 .
Using the democratic method as a criterion, two political regimes can 
be defined as either "democratic" or "illiberal" merely by analysing their 
legislative mechanisms. One cannot do the same with this sort of criterion 
in relation to other areas of the social fabric: economic structure, primary 
groups, phenomena like economic alienation and sexual repression. How 
could one, using the yardstick of compliance with the will of the majority,
1 On the relation between ethics and politics, see N. BOBBIO, Etica e politica, in 
Etica e politico, ed. by W. Tega, Pratiche, Parma 984.





























































































cope with the issues of family organization? Does repression within some 
sort of primary group perhaps depend on the application of the democratic 
method, or otherwise? How can one thereby establish the nature of the 
dependency between wages and capital? If instead we replace that method 
by freedom, accordingly replacing the political/legal method by the value, 
our ability to judge and analyse extends considerably. Is the wage worker 
fre e ? Is woman f r e e l3 Certainly one must start by agreeing on the 
meaning to assign to such an abused term as freedom. The difference 
remains, however, between the legal instrument and the value, between the 
particular and the universal.
From that premise, I wish to draw the following conclusion. The 
(modern) notion of freedom as a universal or universalizable4 value is 
potentially expansive; the democratic method instead constitutes, in
3 Liberal thought has difficulty even asking such questions, since it remains 
attached to an "institutional" conception of power for which it is eminently political power, 
conceived of chiefly as control over the State apparatus. In this theoretical framework - as 
Michel Foucault noted - "the problem o f power tends to be reduced to the problem of 
sovereignty" (M. FOUCAULT, I rapporti di potere passano all'intemo dei corpi, in idem., 
Dalle torture alle celle, ed. by G. Pemi, Lerici, Cosenza 1979, p. 123), negating what 
Foucault calls the "microphysics" of power. In reality - as our French scholar wrote - 
"between man and woman, in the family, between master and pupil, between one who 
knows and one who does not, there are power relations that are not the pure and simple 
projection of overall sovereign power over individuals" (ibid.).
4 It is the formal nature o f universalizability rather than any other substantive feature 
that contains the criterion for distinguishing between "ancient" and "modem" freedom. As 
Moses Finley writes, the Greek concept o f 'freedom' did not go beyond the restrictive 
limits o f the community; the freedom of its members did not involve either legal (civil) 
freedom for all the other residents within the area of the community itself, nor political 
freedom for the members of other dominated communities See M.I. FINLEY, Democracy 




























































































relation to the value "freedom", a bottleneck, a suit two sizes too small. 
Otherwise the method, or better this method, may betray the energy, the 
potentiality, the universality, of the value. This happens in both practical 
terms, where the democratic method is a reduction of the possibilities of 
freedom, and in theoretical terms, where the democratic method is a 
narrower, meaner, criterion for analysis than freedom. This thesis is 
partly supported by the historicity of the democratic method: its practical 
application is only to societies between the seventeenth and the twentieth 
century. This statement does not, however, bind us to any form of 
historicism: while the political instrument sticks totally to the history and 
is a reflection of it (it is for  history), the value, the ethical principle, acts 
dynamically in relation to it (it is in some way against history).
In fact the distinction between "value" and "method" seems sketchy 
and rather vague, if not downright obscure. It would perhaps, then, be 
better to speak of two dinstinct types of "value”: moral and epistemic. 
Moral values are principles that directly guide action. (They may 
nonetheless, in order to be operative in a particular case, and guide actual 
conduct, need further specification). "Epistemic" values are the principles 
that guide us not so much in action as in the process of ascertaining moral 
values, specifying them and deciding in relation to them. We might then 
say that democracy, rather than being a "moral value", is an "epistemic 
value": that is, a value subordinate to the foregoing and instrumental in 
relation to it, functional in terms of its "knowledge"5. We might instead
5 On the "epistemic" value of democracy see C.S. NINO, The Epistemic Value of 
Democracy, in "Ratio Juris", 1991, pp. 36-51. Cf. also C.S. NINO, Positivism and 





























































































maintain that freedom, or still better autonomy, represents a genuine 
moral value.
At this point, one cannot ignore one rather important opposition for 
our initial discussion: between formal and material democracy6. The first 
stops at procedural criteria for producing norms (legality principle, 
majority principle, representation), ignoring their content; the second, as 
well as introducing the requisite criteria for formal democracy, also binds 
the content of legislation, through constitutional principles and rules 
concerning essentially fundamental rights and the citizens' basic needs. For 
this distinction does not alter the terms of our discussion, since formal 
democracy broadly coincides with what we have called "method", to which 
"epistemic" value can be attributed; whereas material democracy goes 
beyond the formal variety just by appealing to what we earlier called 
"value", that is, moral principles like liberty, autonomy, equality and 
solidarity.
This last opposition is an eloquent pointer to the problems that arise 
from a "pure" democratic conception centred round collective decisional 
procedures, "epistemic" assumptions rather than moral values and 
therefore contents. The distinction between "formal democracy" and 
"material democracy" again raises the one between two concepts of the 
"rule of law"; one of them "formal", based on conformity with law 
(understood as an act meeting certain forms and produced through certain 
procedures), where accordingly "right" equals "law"; the other, "material"
6 On this distinction, see e.g. L. FERRAJOLI, II diritto come sistema di garanzie, in 




























































































one is obviously also based on correspondence with the law, but interprets 
this not as a formal act or just as a formal act, but above all as "right", as 
an act of justice. In the one case the law is "law in the formal sense"; in the 
other "law in the material sense"7.
2. The Democratic Method
First one should recall one obvious point, that "democracy is 
essentially a form of government"8, and that the democratic method 
assumes the concept of "law" or of binding collective decisions. That is, it 
consists of a set of procedural rules whose main outcome, going back to 
Norberto Bobbio's definition, is law9, that is, a procedure endowed with 
binding force for the group that laid it down. But what shape do these 
rules take? The answer seems fairly simple. The procedural rules that 
constitute the democratic method number essentially two: delegation of 
power (political representation) and the majority principle.
Delegation of power (political representation) is embodied in the 
transfer of the will of the subject (the one represented, or active
7 For a distinction in these terms between "law in the formal sense" and "law in the 
material sense", see F. NEUMANN, The Rule o f Law. Political Theory and the Legal 
System in Modem Society, Berg, Leamington Spa 1986.
8 A. ROSS, Why Democracy?, English translation by D. Gatley-Philip, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, p. 91.
9 For Norberto Bobbio the "predominant" significance of democracy is that of a "set 
o f procedural rules aimed at securing certain results, o f which the most important is 
approval o f decisions affecting the whole collectivity (which then are, in technical terms, 




























































































electorate) towards another subject (the representative, or passive 
electorate). Thus the terminology of constitutionalist doctrine, with its 
classification into passive electorate versus active electorate, in some sense 
obscures the true power relationship between the two subjects: the 
"passivity" of the cession and the "passive" of the diminution of powers 
become "activity", and the "activity" of acquisition and the "active" of 
increase of powers become "passivity".
The principle of popular sovereignty also has a strong libertarian 
aspect. The idea of national sovereignty (whereby the legislative power, 
even at the outset, lies not with the electorate but with the Assembly of 
Deputies, not in the people but in the Nation) converts this principle into a 
formula for organizing the State10. Political representation, on this view, 
ensures the indipendence of representatives and converts them into rulers. 
The concern here is not so much to link elected and elector as to make any 
legal relation between them impossible (political representation, from the 
legal viewpoint, is not representation), "since it is only in the absence of a 
specific, explicit and formal legal bond that the relationship of political 
representation can retain the structure [...] that allows it to go through the 
whole trajectory that converts the superiors (the electors) into subordinates 
(subjects), and those who ought to be commanded (the representatives) into 
commanders (legislators)"11.
One line of constitutionalist doctrine accordingly elaborated the 
distinction between two forms of representation, Vertretung  and
10 See a now "classic" study by G. SARTORI, La rappresentanza politica, in "Studi 
Politici", 1957, p. 539.




























































































Reprdsentation. One is held to be a conventional relation between two 
subjects, in which the representative more or less faithfully represents the 
actual will of the one represented. The second is held to be an ontological 
relationship of "representation"; the point being not to "represent", to give 
voice to, a will, but existentially to express, to bring out, to give presence 
to, an absence12. In this second case, the representative is not held to be 
bound to the one represented by a conventional or "constitutional" 
relation, but by an "existential", ontological, or organic relation: for 
instance, by belonging to the same class, the same interest group or the 
same race. It is certainly no coincidence that the theory of Reprdsentation 
has also been used to justify the relation between Fiihrer and Gefolgschaft, 
between "leader" and "followers", in national-socialist doctrines.
For a democratic thought, it is certainly desirable for the basis of 
representation in a given political sphere to be extended as broadly as 
possible (but the liberal State arose from an extremely reduced active and 
passive electorate, so that one may deduce that the extent of the electorate 
is not an essential feature), and for the minority to have the possibility, 
though it must bow to the will of the majority, nonetheless to uphold its 
positions and even reverse the relationship with the majority by replacing 
it in the consent of the voters and consequently in possession of the 
Executive. It is on this last point, it may be recalled, that the difference 
becomes clear between the "democratic centralism" of Marxism-Leninism 
and liberal-democratic pratice, where the former eliminates the very
12 See, for instance, C. SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, III ed., Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin 1957, pp. 205 ff., and G. LEIBHOLZ, Das Wesen der Reprdsentation 
unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des Reprasentativsystems. Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen 




























































































political existence of the minority (and its ideological expression) by 
barring it from continuing to uphold its own theses. The essential 
difference between "democratic centralism" and the democratic method 
lies in the fact that in the former the minority politically and ideologically 
(ethically) succumbs, in actions and in ideas, whereas in the latter it 
succumbs only politically, only in actions. To make it clearer: in 
democratic centralism the minority not only has to obey the majority but 
even intimately embrace its positions, since the majority, as a closer 
approximation to the totality, is scientifically and ethically superior, is 
right and just, so that it is no longer possible once the majority decision is 
adopted to present oneself publicly as a minority.
In the liberal-democratic system a fundamental condition (one of the 
"rules of the game") is for the minority, which must nonetheless bow to 
the will of the majority, to be able freely to uphold and disseminate its 
own theses, which, if subsequently supported by the popular vote, may in 
turn become the majority. It is on this possibility for the minority later to 
become the majority that some of the most widespread definitions of 
democracy are based: for instance, the following, offered by Hans Kelsen, 
who stresses more than anything else the fact that the majority, to be such, 
must acknowledge the minority's political dignity. "Democracy, as such, is 
specifically only a formal principle, which gives control to the majority 
view from time to time, without thereby giving a guarantee that just that 
majority should reach what is absolutely good or right. But majority 
control is dinstinguished from any other control by the fact that, in its 
most intimate essence, it not only conceptually presupposes a minority, but 




























































































concept, defends it"13. This conception of democracy is, however, 
deceptive, since even an authoritarian regime could in principle tolerate 
the possibility for today's majority in its decision-making bodies to become 
tomorrow its minority, without having to accept that the minority should 
continue to manifest its own opinion once the collective decision has been 
adopted, nor to acknowledge any particular political dignity to it.
The possibility for the minority to become the majority is essentially 
and intimately connected with the adoption of the majority principle as 
such, without further additions or specifications, and has no especially 
democratic value. The possibility does not have the consequence, either 
conceptually or practically, of giving minorities any political status of 
"recognition": being allowed, say, to present themselves publicly as 
minorities the day after the majority's vote. Adopting the majority 
principle implies only recognition of a collective sphere of decision, that 
is, a space common to both the majority and the minority. Thus, as Otto 
Kirchheimer writes, "when there no longer exists any common value, it is 
by no means clear why it should be the majority to decide"14.
The majority principle involves a strong constraint regarding the will 
of the minority: for the latter must bow to the majority decision, and in 
the final text of the law there will be no trace of the minority position,
13 H. KELSEN, Sozialismus und Stoat. Eine Untersuchung der politischen Theorie 
des Marxismus, ed. by N. Leser, III ed., Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien 
1965, p. 161, emphasis in original.
14 O. KIRCHHEIMER, Zur Staatslehre des Sozialismus und Bolschewismus, now 
in idem. Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus. Die Auflosung der demokratischen 




























































































unless that text is the outcome of a compromise between majority and 
minority positions. Such a compromise may however not be necessary, and 
it is not conceptually implied by the majority principle!5. This makes 
possible a further divergence between the actions of the representative and 
the will, the desires and the interests of those represented.
The essential requirement that binds a subject to a certain action is 
that it can be treated as his act. Given an eclipse of the element of will in 
the subject's conduct, we have a lack of "suitas", that is, a conduct that 
cannot be called the subject's own. But if freedom is equivalent to will, 
saying "I am free" is like saying "I act freely", that is "I want what I do". 
Consequently, transferring will can amount to transferring freedom (and 
power, if freedom is power over oneself), and an unconditioned and 
indiscriminate transfer of will to an unconditioned and indiscriminate 
transfer of freedom.
It is hard to maintain that the majority principle is a feature of 
democratic systems only. Historically and theoretically, the majority 
principle is found connected with institutions of both public law and 15
15 Quite obviously the majority principle is not equivalent nor implies it a "majority" 
electoral system rather than a "proportional" one. One might even think that a majority 
principle meant as a principle of representation according to which majorities are given 
more representatives than those who could be obtained by a strictly proportional 
representation even violates a fundamental principle o f democracy ("one man, one vote”), 
since some "men" (those of the majority) ate counted as bearers o f more than one vote. Cf. 
G.U. RESCIGNO, Democrazia e principio maggiorativo, in "Quaderni costituzionali", 




























































































private law16, and with the most disparate political regimes, including 
dictatorial or despotic ones. (The decisions of the so-called Grand Council 
of Fascism, for instance, were taken in respect for the majority principle). 
The majority may then be either of number, or else of interest, depending 
on whether it is calculated on a "one man one vote" principle or on some 
criterion of unit interests that may vary (like condominium quotas or share 
holdings in private law, or else the "estates" of a feudal parlamentary 
assembly). Thus the conceptual independence of the majority principle 
from the values of democracy has repeatedly been maintained.
What is fundamental, in fact, to define a regime as "democratic" is 
not so much the mere adoption of the majority principle as: (i) the way 
that relevant votes are counted (assuring equal dignity and equal electoral 
weight to the voters), (ii) the extent of the class of will to which the 
majority principle applies. Thus, it is universal suffrage, as Bobbio tells us 
that characterizes democracy, not the majority principle17. "The rules for 
forming collective decisions in a democratic group," writes Bobbio, "are 
more complex, even if the main rule remains that of majority. But the 
majority rule alone is not enough. Other rules are needed to establish who 
constitutes the body that is to decide by majority, how the majority is to be 
counted, and what are its limits of validity, application and efficacy"18.
16 In this connection see F. GALGANO, Il principio di maggioranza nelle società 
personali, CEDAM, Padova 1960.
17 See N. BOBBIO, La regola di maggioranza: limiti e aporie, in N. BOBBIO, C. 
OFFE, S. LOMBARDINI, Democrazia, maggioranza e minoranze, D Mulino, Bologna 
1981, p. 62. See also N. BOBBIO, Democrazia rappresentativa e democrazia diretta, now 
in idem. Il futuro della democrazia, Einaudi, Turin 1984, p. 33.
18 N. BOBBIO, Decisioni individuali e collettive, in Ricerche politiche due. Identità,





























































































In short, isolatedly considered, the majority principle reveals its 
nature as a technical expedient for the formation, or ascription, of the will 
of collective bodies19. In reality, the majority principle as such is anything 
but intrinsically democratic. If it is not to lead to domination by the 
majority and to authoritarian and even violent forms of organization, it 
must, in a sociological perspective, presume (i) strong social cohesion in 
the group it is to be applied to and (ii) widespread acceptance of an attitude 
of tolerance of the "dissident", the "other", "minorities" in general20. 
Indeed, in a normative perspective, the majority principle is relevant for a 
democratic style of political deliberation only if it presupposes a procedure 
based on public discussion among participants seen as holder of inviolable 
equal rights. The majority principle is never merely a majority rule21.
Furthermore, in the democratic method, it is not only the instruments 
(delegation of power and majority principle that can be authoritarian); the 
purpose inhering in this method of politically regulating society may also
N. BOBBIO, Rappresentanza e interessi, in Rappresentanza e democrazia, ed. by G. 
Pasquino, Laterza, Bari 1988.
19 Cf. N. BOBBIO, La regola di maggioranza: limiti e aporie, cit., p. 43. This is 
also the thesis of E. RUFFINI, La ragione dei più. Ricerche sulla storia del principio 
maggioritario. Il Mulino, Bologna 1977. According to Ruffini the majority principle is not 
a legal institution, "but an empirical formula to resolve particular situations within the 
"sphere of collectivity" (ibid., p. 19). Nonetheless, he believes that "in the most disparate 
historical situations, the majority principle has always been opposed by the same 
adversary: the authority principle, the intolerance of those who hold power" (ibid., pp. 18- 
19).
20 See A, PIZZORUSSO, Minoranze e maggioranze, Einaudi, Turin 1993, p. 43.
21 Cf. J. HABERMAS, Faktizitat und Celtung. Beitrage zur Diskurstheorie des 





























































































be. For, as we have said, the democratic method is also a method of 
making laws. These, understood as prescriptions associated with a sanction 
in the event of breach, can be issued by those holding power through 
various procedures; the democratic method is only one of these. The 
making of law could do without either political representation or the 
majority principle, as happens, for instance, in absolute monarchy, where 
the figure of the monarch is not representative of anyone else save maybe 
God, and the monarch, being an individual organ, does not need the 
majority principle to issue his provisions. In this acceptance the law, as 
positive State law, is the formalization of the "power" that legitimizes itself 
and becomes "authority"22. In fact, to judge the extent to which a 
democratic political organization adheres to a condition of freedom of the 
citizens, one must have regard not just to the instruments (procedures), but 
also to the outcomes, to the ends (the measures considered in themselves). 
Anyway it is controversial whether the adoption of a democratic style of
22 As we know, Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves, reformulating an idea o f Max 
Weber’s, identifies three basic forms of manifestation of the phenomenon of power: force, 
pow er  (understood here in a more specific sense) and authority. Passerin d'Entrèves 
explains the concept o f "force" by comparing it to the power wielded by a bandit, the 
concept of "power" by comparing it to the power a policeman has, and finally the concept 
of "authority" by citing the power exercised by "experts”. In the first case ("force", the 
bandit) we are in the presence of "a situation of pure force, o f naked power: a situation in 
which, in the current expression, 'might beats right'. In the second case ("power”, the 
policeman) we are in the presence of "an 'institutionalized' force exercised in conformity 
with law". Finally, in the case o f authority (the "expert", or wise man), this concept 
implies a mark of recognition by others o f the legitimacy (not to be confused with legality) 
o f the power exercised (see A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, La dottrina dello Stato. 
Elementi di analisi e di interpretazione, Giappichelli, Turin 1967, pp. 9-10, A. PASSERIN 
D'ENTREVES, Obbedienza e resistenza di una società democratica. Comunità, Milan, 
1970, especially chapter II, and A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, Il palchetto assegnato agli 




























































































deliberation is sufficient to change the natiure of an act which has a strong 
coercive character. Coercion even if democratic is still coercion.
The assumption of a popular sovereignty and its inclusion in the 
process of law-making, with the resulting equation of law with popular 
will, seems to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the State, which 
accordingly becomes democratic. Here legitimacy is equivalent to legality, 
and justice is conformity with the law23. We might thus overturn the 
assertion that the democratic method constitutes a means of expression of 
dissent into the position that the democratic method is the formal 
intermediary allowing, using Alessandro Passerin d'Entreves's 
terminology, the passage from "power" to "authority", that is, one of the 
possible ways to form the social consensus regarding constituted power. 
Here the special feature of the democratic method would seem to be 
indifference to the contents around which the consensus forms.
3. Institutions and Civil Society
Parliament is one of the three traditional powers into which the 
liberal State is structured: it is the seat of legislative power, the locus for 
issuing the law. This structuring of political power (in the broad sense) 
into Government (executive power, or political power in the strict sense), 
Parliament (legislative power) and Magistracy (judiciary power) is one of 
the major differences between the State based on the rule of law and the
23 Cf. A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, Obbedienza e resistenza in una società 




























































































absolutist State. This tripartite division turns around the concept of law 
(general and abstract) and would not be possible without it. In turn, 
however, the modern concept of law is possible only within the sphere of 
distinction of three aspects more or less independent of each other: 
promulgation (legislation), application (administration) and ascertainment 
(jurisdiction).
Here the difference between the State based on the rule of law and the 
democratic State may be grasped. In the first, law is the key concept in the 
political order. The legislature (the Parliament) expresses only one aspect 
of a complex action oriented towards a principle higher than the three 
aspects considered individually: the law. In the democratic State, the 
fundamental concept is that of popular sovereignty, for which the aspect of 
promulgation of the law (through which that sovereignty is directly 
expressed) seems to have primacy in relation to the subsequent aspects of 
application and ascertainment, which are no longer subordinate to the law 
as the State's organizational principle (the law as such) but to the 
expression of popular sovereignty handed down in the law.
While in the State based on the rule of lawthe law is relevant for its 
formal characteristics, in the democratic State the law applies because 
through it the process of popular decision-making is expressed. In the first 
case the law is a value in itself; in the second it has more of an 
instrumental value in relation to the end of popular sovereignty. The State 
based on rule of law is accordingly entirely included within the sphere of 
the political and legal order, is all inside the horizon of political society; 
the democratic State, instead, refers to a meta-legal principle (popular 




























































































the former the guarantee of freedom is the separation of political power 
(in the broad sense) into three subpowers and their subjection to law, in 
the latter that guarantee lies in entry by the bodies of civil society into the 
political dimension, and hence in subjection of political power (in the 
broad sense) to the needs and rights of civil society.
The division of powers, as has often been pointed out, is never 
completely sharp, and is in fact full of mutual overlaps (administrative 
competences of the Magistracy, judiciary powers of Parliament, and so 
on). Still less is it perfect: the relationship among the three powers is often 
unequal, frequently weighted in favour of the executive power, which 
keeps greater weight to itself than the other two, and possibilities of 
determining their attitudes. Nor should one forget the novelty brought by 
the institution of a Constitutional Court to the traditional pattern of 
division of powers. Democratic States since the Second World War have 
been marked, by comparison with the previous model of liberal State, in 
particular by adoption of "rigid" constitutions and of organs deputed 
specifically to the exercise of "constitutional justice", that is, verification 
of the constitutionality of ordinary laws. Now there is no doubt that 
Constitutional Courts, in the shape they take in, say, Federal Germany, 
democratic Spain and republican Italy, represent a type of authority that 
cannot be brought within the framework of the traditional division of 
powers. Constitutional courts are at one and the same time judiciary and 
legislative organs, that is, organs endowed with a certain power of 




























































































exercised by the respective Parliaments24. Nor can it be said that the 
institution of a Constitutional Court or judicial review of constitutionality 
derives logically from the existence of a written Constitution, even a rigid 
one25.
Parliament is thus one sector in the structure of State power, that is 
increasingly less endowed with effective power in the development of 
contemporary States. The freedoms guaranteed to citizens are rooted at the 
base of the institutional pyramid and do not constitute a real political 
institution proper. In these rights we can nonetheless distinguish an 
authoritarian aspect inherent in the legal decision that lays them down, and 
a libertarian aspect, one of autonomy of the citizens who thus have a 
formal sphere of movement of their own: these two aspects might qite 
obviously conflict with each other.
When their source of legitimation and production lies not with the 
citizens but in Parliament (a part of political society), rights may escape 
the control and the creativity of those who are assumed to be their bearers. 
But to the extent that these rights correspond to practical action by citizens 
freely developing their own sphere of autonomy, they constitute, whatever 
be their "source", a substantial area of freedom. Equally, the real 
guarantee of their maintenance is their full exercise by the individuals and
24 A court having the power of declaring statutes as null or void of legal effects - 
says Kelsen - is an authority holding a legislative competence. See H. KELSEN, La 
garantie juridictionelle de la Constitution (La Justice constitutionelle), in "Annuaire de 
l'Institut international de droit public"', 1929, pp. 129 ff.
25 On this point see the interesting considerations by C.S.NINO, Derecho, moral y 




























































































the pressure the latter manage to exercise over "political society", by 
tirelessly seeking to control its expansionist aims. Freedom, therefore, in a 
democratic system, lies in this pressure to make formal rights into 
substantive positions of autonomy of the subjects.
Civic freedoms, even if formally granted (conceded from above) and 
constantly exposed to the work of erosion by political power, which by its 
own internal dynamics tends to expand till it covers with its normative web 
the whole social fabric, determining the stages in their subjects' lives, 
nonetheless make life livable. And if actually applied in the daily practice 
of collective behaviour, then they constitute barriers to the invasiveness of 
political power.
This dynamics of conflict between civic freedoms and public powers 
reveals the contradiction and the compromise that lie at the basis of the 
creation of liberal regimes. The contradiction and compromise lie between 
the further reproduction of authority and the assertion that it is the 
emanation no longer of Providence but of the "general will", between the 
reproduction of the social hierarchy and the assertion that it is the 
emanation of the subordinate social group, between sovereignty (for which 
the sole source of law is the State) and legal subjectivity (for which the 
individual seems to have a legal dignity of its own that the order 
recognizes but does not attribute). The possibility of mediating between 
civil freedoms and political power, between the need to establish the new 
State and the citizens' need for autonomy, runs through just this 
theorization of the "general will", that is, an abstract will not anchored in 
the multiple individual and group wills (and interests), but the expression 




























































































The new power (the rising liberal State) legitimizes itself through an 
entity that is just as abstract as Providence, namely the Nation. The 
theorization of the "general will", a will that de facto does not exist, that is 
constructed through a purely rationalist procedure ("a fiction of jurists", 
said Proudhon) allows what is often only the ceding of will to be converted 
into representation, and the acts of the legislative assembly to be 
ideologically superimposed on the will of the Nation. Nonetheless, one 
should not underestimate the "universalizing" function played by this 
category. The category of Nation can be used as a tangible symbol of a 
general interest that cannot be reduced to the mere sum of individual 
interests without falling prey to particularist egoism. There remain, 
however, the problems connected on the one hand with its recurrent 
antireflexive foundation (objectivist, naturalistic, or historicist)26 and on 
the other its limited "universalizing" scope (it applies only to the Nation, 
and is turned round into a particularist weapon against everything that 
cannot be included in the Nation itself).
In democratic systems, citizens' political action might be reduced to 
an operation of choosing their own sovereigns (or more frequently, one 
third of the sovereigns, that is, the sovereigns enthroned in one third of the 
whole space of Power). The elector does not determine his representative's 
action, but simply confers on him the capacity to will in his name and in
26 There is, however, as we know, a conventional or constitutionalist foundation of 
the Nation, which finds its most classic formulation in the words of Sieyès: "Qu'est-ce 
qu'une nation? un corps d'associés vivant sous une loi commune et représentés par la 
même législature" (E. SIEYES, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat'!, Presses Universitaires de 




























































































his interest27. Elimination of the binding mandate and of corporate 
representation - "each member of Parliament represents the Nation and 
exercises his functions without being bound by a mandate", says article 67 
of the Constitution of the Italian Republic - is the revolutionary innovation 
of the bourgeois electoral mechanism by comparison with what prevailed 
in the previous feudal assemblies (Parliaments, States general, etc.). It is 
the outcome of a combination of "universalizing" pressures and of merely 
centralizing, statist tendencies.
"It is today clear", writes Biscaretti di Ruffia, an influential Italian 
public lawyer, "that the collectivity of the people (what Art. 67 of the 
Italian Constitution calls Nation) has no autonomous will of its own that 
can be represented, nor does the Chamber when deciding manifest a will 
that can be attributed to the people, nor can it be stated that the Chamber, 
in deliberating, gives consistency to that will of the popular collectivity, 
which, not being itself a subject of law, would not be capable of 
manifesting specific volitions [...]: since the Chamber brings into being 
decisions that are indisputably its own, or better, since in general the 
Chamber is merely an organ of the State, decisions of the State itself. And 
the Chamber decides in full freedom, since each of its members can act 
without any specific bond to his voters, but only bearing in mind, in 
conscience, the aspirations, tendencies and generic interests the latter
27 An authoritative part o f Continental constitutionalist doctrine, denying that 
elections give origin to a relation of representation and therefore that Parliament has any 
representative character, speaks of election as a "designation of capacity", or as the best 
way to choose the subjects to constitute the State's legislative power (cf. what is written by 
the "father" of modern Italian public law, V.E. ORLANDO, Del fondamento giuridico 





























































































have"28. This author defines political representation, from the viewpoint 
of its legal basis, as legal and necessary representation, since "the 
representative nature of the elected Chamber does not have to be [...] 
legally founded upon election, considered in and for itself (which seems 
more to constitute in this connection a condition or requirement laid down 
by the positive order), but must instead be related to the enactments 
contained in the legislative provisions concerning it (for Italy, for instance, 
Art. 67 of the Constitution)"29.
Elections, from this viewpoint, are not the foundation of the 
representative nature of the elective assembly's decisions (since this 
foundation is to be found inside the State legal order in the norms of 
positive law), but only a condition for the efficacy of that representativity, 
for it to become concrete, that is, a de facto requirement in relation to the 
legal norm. This interpretation is based on another thesis by Biscaretti di 
Ruffia, who after distinguishing sovereignty (understood as "highest power 
of government") into (a) political source of governing power and (b) legal 
entitlement of governing power, asserts that only sovereignty as in (a) can 
be attributed to the people, while sovereignty as in (b) is to be attributed to 
the State30. The people is accordingly not legally sovereign, is not the 
original holder of governing power; all that can be found in it is the 
source of political legitimation of that power. In different words, the 
problem of consensus remains extralegal, and is solved through an 
ideological connection (this is the meaning of the adjective "political" as
28 P. BISCARETTI DI RUFFIA, Diritto Costituzionale, Jovene, Naples 1972, p. 
269, my emphasis.
29 Ibid., p. 271.




























































































used by Biscaretti) between people and elective assembly. This ideological 
(and not legal) connection is inplemented through the mechanism of 
elections.
Faced with the difficulties of democratically justifying (in reference 
to the will of all the subjects who are members of a political community) 
political representation, some even base it on the functional differentiation 
of social roles. Representation is then held to be the outcome of a sort of 
"division of labour" whereby in a given society there are supposed to be 
some individuals whose role is that of acting on behalf of the whole social 
group to pursue its purposes, and then individuals whose "role" is that of 
accepting (but why not just say "undergoing") the decisions taken on their 
behalf31. The "representation" is thus conceived of as a form of political 
leadership, differentiated only by the fact that the subjects "competent" to 
exercise that leadership are chosen through a special mechanism, namely 
elections. In other respects there would be no difference between a 
"representative" (or democratic) political system and, let us say, an 
aristocratic political organization. On this view, speaking of "popular 
sovereignty" or "government of the people" would have a merely 
ideological or persuasive function.
31 This is, I believe, the central idea in F.J. LAPORTA, Sobre la teorìa de la 
democracia y el concepto de representación politica; algunas propuestas para debate in 
"Doxa", n. 6, 1989, pp. 121 ff„ who essentially reformulates one of Kelsen's theses. The 
same line is taken, developing ideas o f Schumpeter's, by Niklas Luhmann, and in Italy by 
Danilo Zolo. (See e.g. the latter's La democrazia difficile, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1989). 
This amounts to a rehash in different words of the "realistic" critique o f democracy of 
which Italian political thought, with its traditional insensitivity to the normative viewpoint, 




























































































The growing complexity of industrial societies would compel us to 
abandon the normative ideals of a collective administration of public 
affairs, consigning us, with the inexorability characteristic of the laws of 
history, to the "democratic principate", a regime which, Luhmann 
maintains, would be democratic only to the extent that its highest level is 
split into a "government" and an "opposition". For this theoretical 
approach, of course, there is a no bridging between direct democracy and 
representative democracy: these are seen as two radically distinct political 
forms32. But this is the point at which this "functionalist" foundation of 
political representation shows its limit: that of having to abandon the 
"guiding idea" of democracy, its foundational myth, government by the 
people.
The "realist" abandonment of this normative horizon is sometimes 
compensated for by a sprinkling of "rights". "Possible democracy" would 
then consist in a "principate" more or less split in two (government and 
opposition, say) accompanied by a court of rights that attenuates its 
authoritarian grip over civil society. A "principate", however, even if 
"democratic", is no longer democracy as a political form that universalizes 
(even if only in a historically and geographically determined political 
space) the principle of individual autonomy. On the other hand, this 
"realistic" revision of democracy is (unrealistically) constrained to neglect 
one fundamental aspect of contemporary democratic States: that they have 
"rigid" constitutions loaded with metalegal values directly applicable (with 
greater or lesser force) by the various judiciary organs. 32
32 For this argument see, for instance, E. FORSTHOFF, Democrazia e 




























































































In reality, even supposing (though not conceding) that there is an 
evolutionary movement in modern societies from less to more 
"complexity", this finding still tells us almost nothing about the 
possibilities of implementing a democratic system. That complexity must 
be given a description in value terms so as to arrive at an assessment of the 
congruency between the complex social situation and democratic ideals. 
Luhmann and his followers ultimately have a negative  image of 
complexity, as something that untowardly increases the risks of social 
coexistence, so that reassuring authoritarian intervention becomes 
necessary, a different evaluation of the fact of complexity can be given; 
one might, nonetheless, regard it as a positive factor for the realization of 
a democratic model, if the complexity is interpreted as an aspect that 
instead of jeopardizing the security of social relations and thus requiring 
more authority and less freedom, increases the wealth and strength of civil 
society and allows government pressure on it to be loosened33.
4. The Division of Powers
A fundamental of liberal political and constitutional theory is the 
structuring of institutional power (or political power in the broad sense) 
into three subsystems: the executive (the Government, or political power 
in the narrow sense), the legislature (the Chambers) and the judiciary (the 
Magistracy). This is the theory of the division of powers that passes the 3
33 For a position of this sort see J.S. MILL, Considerations on Representative 
Government, in idem, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative 




























































































aristocratic critique of the Monarch's absolutism down into the 
organization of the contemporary democratic State.
But what is meant in this theory by "powers": an institution, an order, 
or a functions'll Or do the three traditional powers constitute separate 
"orders", or rather distinct "functions"? The difference is not a minor one, 
since in the first case the separation is radical and there will come to be 
three "states" within the State, while in the second the State retains its 
unitary nature, unravelling for distinct functions, in some cases even 
attributable to one and the same body. There can be no doubt of the 
unitary nature of modern State power, and the concern not to attack this 
unity has made all liberal and democratic constitutions provide 
mechanisms for merging the three powers, coordinating organs, overlaps 
of spheres that ought to have remained rigidly separate once the theory 
had been accepted. Thus in the 1948 Italian Constitution the President of 
the Republic is a sort of coordinator and supervisor, through the various 
constitutional functions he covers, of the three divided powers. On the 
other hand, each power (or "function") handles cases which ought not to 
be within its province were the division rigorously consistent. One may, 
then, conclude, that "no positive order can be seen as rigorously and 
consistently applying the principle of separation of powers"34 5.
34 Cfr. Piero Calamandrei's intervention at the Italian Constituent Assembly 
preparing the new Republican Constitution in La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori 
preparatori della Assemblea Costituente, voi. 8, Camera dei deputati, Roma 1971, p. 
1913.




























































































Executive, legislature, and judiciary, understood in the "classical" 
sense, are nothing but the distinct activity of various organs of the State, 
functions of one and the same political power, or even aspects of one and 
the same practical reasoning (on the well-known portrayal by Kant in the 
Metaphysics of Morals^), and not distinct powers the sum of which would 
give us a constitutional organization of the State. The State founds and 
organizes the three powers, it is not the three powers that organize and 
found the State; otherwise the orders and corporations of feudalism, 
abhorred by the new bourgeois law, would have been transferred from 
civil society to political society, no less. Nor should one forget that in the 
liberal division of powers, these are not ascribed the same dignity and that 
there is one power which is superior to the other two and from which 
these derive their legitimacy36 7.
De facto, however, since the "function" tends to become power and to 
be identified with the organ that exercises it, in the evolution of the liberal
36 But before Kant it was Condorcet: "Entre la loi et la chose qui doit être faite 
d'après elle, on l'individu qui doit s'y soumettre, se trouve la fonction de déclarer que telle 
est, dans telle circostance, l'application de la loi, c'est-à-dire, la fonction de faire un 
syllogisme dont la loi est la majeure un fait plus ou moins générale, la mineure, et la 
conclusion, l'application de la loi" (CONDORCET, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques 
dans une nation libre, in idem., Oeuvres, ed. by A. Condorcet O'Connor and M.F. Arago, 
vol. 10, Firmin Didot, Paris 1847, p. 595). An see now Habermas' reconstruction of the 
division of powers as running along the line which marks the difference between a 
"discourse of justification" an a "discourse of application" both pertaining to the domain of 
"legal discourse", and taking place respectively in legislation and adjudication, whereas the 
administrative power is considered as lying within the sphere of a "pragmatical discourse" 
ruled no longer by rules and principles but rather policies and prudential considerations 
(see J. HABERMAS, op. ult. cit., pp. 212-213, pp. 229 ss.).




























































































State that is what we see: the rise of powerful "separate bodies", proud and 
jealous of their constitutional autonomy, and hence not responsible towards 
each other. This, far from shaping the State in accordance with a more 
flexible, open structure, has rigidified it into opposing blocks, now devoid 
of awareness of their original, "ideological" role: "exercising public 
functions", "being at the service of", "representing and faithfully 
interpreting the will of the Nation". However, on several quarters people 
think they can see in this greater distance, this separateness of the three 
powers (but the process of corporatization is much broader and more 
diffuse, operating well beyond the traditional division and well beyond the 
institutional plane), a separateness that has taken shape also and especially 
in relation to the rest of society (that is, not just between the powers 
constituting "political society" but also between "political society" and 
"civil society"), a guarantee of further democracy and freedom.
The Judiciary in Italy is a case in point: its power, and its 
separateness, have increased in proportion to the progressive maturation, 
in a democratic sense, of the institutions. In the umbertine State and more 
in the fascist regime, the judge was subject to severe conditioning by the 
executive. The Albertine Statute (the first constitution of the Italian State) 
read in article 68: as follows "Justice emanates from the King, and is 
administered in His name by the judges that He creates." In this way, there 
came into being a relation of direct hierarchical subordination between 
Magistrate and constitutional monarch38.
38 On this point, F.S. MERLINO, Politica e magistratura in Italia dal 1860 ad oggi, 
Gobetti, Turin 1925, has lost none of its freshness and power. Cf. also M. D'ADDIO, 
Politica e magistratura (1848-1876), Giuffit, Milan 1966, and the more recent contribution 




























































































Marco Minghetti, an Italian liberal politician of the second half of 
Nineteenth century, following Locke, held that the Judiciary did not 
constitute an autonomous power distinct from the executive. He identified 
only two powers within the State's organization: legislation and 
administration. The juridical function was thus conceived of as a specific 
mode of execution of the law, of administration: the administration of 
justice. "The Juciciary ought not be set in a separate sphere from 
administration as such; for both are branches into which the execution of 
the law is divided. Thus there can be only two powers, the one that makes 
the law and the one that executes it, the latter of which, according to its 
differing object and different mode of action, can be distinguished into 
judicial and administrative"39. However, the fact that the Judiciary is not a 
conceptually autonomous power in relation to the executive does not 
prevent it taking the shape of an institutionally independent power: "Justice 
is indeed a branch of the executive power, but a branch that operates 
independently"40.
39 M. MINGHETTI, I partiti politici e la ingerenza loro nella giustizia e 
nell'am m inistrazione, ed. by B. Widmar, Cappelli, Bologna 1969, p. 96. In this 
connection cf. G.M. CHIODI, La giustizia amministrativa nel pensiero politico di Silvio 
Spaventa, Laterza, Bali 1969, p. 66. On the position of dependency of the judicial power 
in relation to the executive in the post-unification period, one may usefully consult pp. 63- 
70 o f  Giulio M. Chiodi's work cited. In general theory of law, a conception that reduces 
the judicial function to the executive (administrative) one is offered us by Hans Kelsen's 
"pure theory", when it sees both the judge and the administrative official as producers of 
individual norms (see e.g. H. KELSEN, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Springer, Berlin 1925, 
pp. 229 ff).




























































































In republican Italy, after a period of settling down and "constitutional 
freeze"41, the birth of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, a 
constitutional authority with exclusive competence on the internal 
organization of the Judiciary, give the judge greater independence. The 
independence of the "judicial function" was very quickly confused with the 
autonomy of the "judicial order", which became very powerful because it 
was no longer in any way accountable towards the executive power, the 
Government in charge, and jealous of that non-responsibility as an 
essential feature of the democratic State42. It is from this too that the 
politicization of judges and movements like Magistratura Democratica 
arise, attributing a progressive value to acts in themselves often indeed 
authoritarian, issued under the logic of the "order", which are however, it 
is now asserted, oriented towards the "public good", or the interest of the 
lower classes, or the implementation of constitutional principles43. This
41 Cf. E. CHELI, Costituzione e sviluppo delle istituzioni in Italia, Il Mulino, 
Bologna 1978, especially pp. 56-59, 158-161, and 169-173.
42 One who is in favour of introducing the political responsibility o f judges as an 
application of the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty (Art 1 o f the republican 
Constitution) is Cheli, whose observations I would refer to: cf. E. CHELI, op.cit., pp. 
143-149. In this connection see M. CAPPELLETTI, Giudici irresponsabili? Studio 
comparativo sulla responsabilità dei giudici, Giuffrè, Milan 1988.
43 It is curious that the sectors o f the Judiciary most committed in a democratic 
sense, who proclaim themselves as interpreters, as vehicles, of popular sovereignty, are 
(or have been) convinced asserters o f the separateness of their own "order", excluding any 
form of political responsibility o f the judge (or of the public prosecutor). Being an 
"interpreter" o f popular sovereignty (already in the heading on top o f verdicts, "in the 
name of the people"), thus remains bound up exclusively with the individual magistrate's 
commitment, his ideological convictions, and not with any institutional mechanism 
introducing direct contact between the function of judging, the magistracy and civil 
society. The need for this connection between the judicial institution and civil society was





























































































attitude may however be seen close to paternalism or to a sort of 
enlightened despotism to which the maxim "everything for the people, 
nothing thanks to the people" applies, since be he called "people", "lower 
classes", "proletariat" or "civil society", the citizen as such has only slight 
possibilities of participating in the judicial function. Nor can this opinion 
be modified by citing the case of the so-called giudici popolari ("lay" 
judges) that contribute to the formation of the Courts of Assizes44, nor by 
the argument of the "passivity" and "impartiality" that characterize the 
judicial activity. The argument of the judge's "passivity", or better of the 
possibility granted to the citizen to set a judicial action going, clashes with 
the fact that the judge has almost exclusive power of assessment in relation 
to the demands and information reaching him from the citizen. The 
argument of "impartiality" should be better clarified. It is not that judges 
are a race apart, somehow genetically endowed with the virtue of 
impartiality. The impartiality spoken of in connection with legal action
Congress o f the Association (see "Magistratura Democratica", March-June 1979), but the 
link is reduced to portraying Magistratura Democratica as an "articulation of civil society”. 
M.D. is defined as "articulation o f civil society" insofar as that association claims the 
independence and specificity o f the judge's own role: "We have defined MD as an 
articulation of civil society just because it places itself not on the ground of general policies 
but more on that of associations operating for sectors o f general ends".
44 "The lively criticism against the present composition of the Courts o f Assizes," 
wrote Girolamo Bellavista more than twenty years ago, "deserves full support. The 
popular judges often ressemble, in relation to the President’s initiatives and opinions, the 
last two invitees to Don Rodrigo's table in Manzoni's novel. The collegiate judge in this 
case becomes bicratic, if not indeed monocratic. The system is an outcome of compromise 
between Fascist legislation and the constitution (Art. 102, last clause) which calls for 
popular involvement in the administration of justice; but the compromise reduces the 
involvement to a sort o f deplorable stick-on involvement, through the practical subjection 
of the popular judges to the President's opinio delicti, or otherwise" (G. BELLAVISTA, 




























































































refers not to the qualities of the man who carries out the action, but to the 
qualities of the procedures that regulate the action itself. It is the judicial 
procedure that is (or ought to be) impartial. For that to be the case, it is 
not enough for it to be conducted by a gentleman in gown (and posibly a 
wig), the winner of a public competition.
The democratic method, representation and the majority principle 
apply only to the legislature. They do not apply to the executive or the 
judiciary. The deputy is elected; but who elects the judge or the general? 
Here - at least in most systems of Continental Europe - it is criteria of 
career and subordination that apply, criteria of merit and seniority, if not 
clientship. The judge is separate from civil society to the same extent as is 
the general. He is not elected, he is a civil servant. His accession to the 
post, as for the bureaucrat, comes about through a mechanism that is more 
a process of cooptation45. No control, no possibility of influence over his 
decisions can be exercised by the citizens as a collective body46. This, 
indeed, partly meets the need for impartiality that is a central and
45 Cf.G. U. RESCIGNO, Divisione dei poteri, in Dizionario critico del diritto, ed. 
by C. Donati, Savelli, Rome 1980, p. 97.
46 The independence (independence of the executive power) o f the judge has often 
been confused with separateness (independence from civil society). As far as separateness 
goes, we cannot see that any State legal order, except in very limited forms in English- 
speaking countries (where the law is still largely customary) has ever been concerned to 
reduce or overcome it. As far as independence from the executive power is concerned, it is 
a general need to distinguish the two branches of the magistracy, examining magistrates 
and judges. In Italy, as we know, until the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura was set 
up, while formally the examining magistracy was independent, the same could not be said 
of the office of public prosecutor. For the present Italian position in this connection cf. A. 
PIZZORUSSO, L'organizzazione della giustizia in Italia, Revised ed., Einaudi, Turin 




























































































justificatory feature of the judicial function. The ascertainment of a fact, 
of the truthfulness of a declaration or of breach of the law cannot depend 
on majority criteria.
One cannot but agree with Professor Ferrajoli when he writes that 
"no majority can make true what is false, or false what is true, nor, 
therefore, legitimize through its consensus a sentence that is unfounded for 
lack of proof'47. The same concern is at the basis of the criticisms of 
theories, like Habermas's philosophy, that tend to make truth and justice a 
question of consensus, and hence ultimately of majorities48. Nonetheless, 
in a political system that calls itself democratic the judicial activity cannot 
do without more than formal reference to the popular will, for instance as 
regards the composition of the judicial organs or through introduction of 
real responsibility of the judge for decisions taken contrary to law, 
constitutional principles or more general principles of equity.
Nor is the law enough to give legitimacy to the judicial function. In a 
democratic, constitutional system this function cannot be justified by mere 
reference to the validity of the law to be applied. While in the State based 
on the rule of law, the Rechtsstaat of German doctrine, the judge derives 
his legitimacy solely from the law, that is, from his role as "subsumption 
automat"49, this source of legitimacy is insufficient in the democratic
47 L. FERRAJOLI, op. tit., p. 155.
48 This is the direction taken by Ota Weinberger's critique of both Habermas and 
Alexy. See e.g. O. WEINBERGER, Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against 
Pseudo-Arguments in Practical Philosophy, in ''Ratio Juris", 1992, pp. 251-268.
49 Cf. R. OGOREK, Richterkonig Oder Subsumtionsautomat? Zur Justiztheorie im 




























































































constitutional State. For in it legality is a quality subordinate to the other 
one of "constitutionality", and can thus continue to be subjected to an 
assessment of adequacy or correspondence in relation to this second, 
higher quality. "Legitimation cannot, for any organ, for any institution, 
and therefore not even for the judge," it has recently been said, "be 
entirely resolved [...] into pure legality; on the simple ground that legality 
is no longer 'simple' or enough by itself, given the emergence of new 
value horizons which, with the constitution, are deployed in positions that 
may even be antagonistic to the law and to legality"50. But what does it 
mean that the judge has to be legitimated before the Constitution? That he 
has to apply its principles and values, is the answer. This answer, however, 
refers to a broader discretionary power of the judge, which, in the absence 
of criteria and mechanisms for democratic control over the judicial 
activity, ends by increasing its irresponsibility.
The executive power, the public administration, are organized and 
perform their specific function not according to the democratic method 
(irrespective of whether they derive from the people), but according to the 
hierarchical method. Nor need they respect any principle of impartiality 
or equity. The permanence of the institution of the Army, structured 
according to a graduated scale of authority that is greatest at the top and 
zero at the base, the survival within the fabric of the democratic State of 
this unreformed institution that often erodes the dignity of the citizen who 
becomes a soldier, points to the problems of the democratic regime as a
50 C. MEZZANOTTE, Sulla nozione di indipendenza del giudice, in Magistratura, 




























































































mere organizational formula51. The army, the whole public 
administration, the executive, function according to the principle of 
hierarchy52. And this principle is hard to limit. "In any case", writes 
Bobbio, "one thing is certain: that the two great blocks of topdown, 
hierarchical power in every complex society, the giant corporation and the 
public administration, have not yet been even nibbled at by the process of 
democratization. And for as long as these two blocks resist attack by the 
forces pressing from below, the democratic transformation of society 
cannot be said to have happened"53.
If transparency, publicity, is one of the requirements of the 
democratic system54, and this publicity is the outcome of certain 
procedures for forming the collective will based on confronting and 
openly discussing the alternatives in question, and checking on the name 
and activity of whoever has to implement the collective decisions, then at 
least as far as the executive power is concerned such publicity is largely 
absent. Things are different as regards the judiciary power, distinguished 
from the executive, just because it is subject to certain forms that 
determine its decisions, foremost among them the obligation to give
51 On the incompatibility between the traditional organization of an army and 
democratic principles, see the fine pages by C. LEVI, Paura della libertà. III ed., Einaudi, 
Turin 1975, pp. 95 ff.
52 On the principle o f hierarchy in the activity o f the public administration, cf. G. 
ZANOBINI, Corso di Diritto Amministrativo, voi. 1 (Principi generali), Giuffrè, Milan 
1958, C. MORTATI, Istituzioni di Diritto Pubblico, voi. 1, Cedam, Padua 1975, pp. 608- 
610.
53 N. BOBBIO, Democrazia rappresentativa e democrazia diretta, ciL, p. 47.
54 In this connection see the considerations by N. BOBBIO, La democrazia e il 




























































































grounds for verdicts, sanctioned for instance in article 111 of the Italian 
republican constitution.
5. Social Transformation and Civil Liberties
There are those who hold that the democratic method is a means for 
transforming society in an antiauthoritarian direction. In fact the 
democratic method, which as we have seen can also be one of the possible 
methods for establishing who is to issue the command and be at the top of 
society's hierarchical scale, does not necessarily query the principle of 
hierarchy (it may at most temper it). That is why it may be maintained that 
it is a method for organizing, structuring, political power and social 
hierarchy. Accordingly, it is stretching things to say it can by itself, as 
some sort of internal logic, be a means for social transformation.
Not only is the democratic method a method of organizing political 
power; it may be so also for this power, the power in place, since it may 
not call into discussion the overall structure of the State and the general 
running of the system, of which it is a mechanism. Only the identity of the 
élites may be shaken by the outcome of a general election, not the system 
of political élites55. Thus, the democratic method may be (i) conservative,
55 By "political élite" I mean what Gaetano Mosca means by "political class" (or
"ruling class"). For Mosca, in every society "there are two classes of people: the rulers and
the ruled. The first, always the less numerous, carries out all the political functions,
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages associated with it; while the second, more
numerous, is directed and regulated by the former in more or less legal, or else more or





























































































because it organizes this power (the power in place), because it is respect 
for the rules of the game where the game is the circulation of political 
élites; (ii) authoritarian, insofar as it organizes the power, that is, is a 
method for making up a hierarchial scale.
The democratic method, especially the principle of representative 
government, according to which representatives are not bound by any 
instruction of their electors but only by the general interest, can be one of 
the ways of forming the political class (the rulers, the Power). Kelsen is 
explicit on this; for him representation government is pure ideology. "The 
function of this ideology — he adds — is to conceal the real situation, to 
maintain the illusion that the legislator is the people, in spite of the fact 
that, in reality, the functions of the people — or, more correctly 
formulated, of the electorate — is limited to the creation of the legislative 
organ"56 Sartori criticizes Kelsen's position, though agreeing that "the 
elections are a way, or rather one of the ways, used for the purpose of 
designating the rulers"57. He rejects the radicality of Kelsen's critique, 
since the fact that in representative governments the rulers are chosen 
through the democratic method has, in his view, decisive effects on what 
they do (on "how" they rule). Accordingly, for Sartori the elections should 
not be seen as an "act of appointment" but as a "power": "The error [...] 
has been to look at elections as an act of nomination, whereas instead they
means of subsistence and those needed for the vitality o f the political organism" (G. 
MOSCA, Elementi di scienza politico, vol. 1, Laterza, Bari 1953, p. 78).
56 H. KELSEN, General Theory o f Law and State, English translation by A. 
Wedber, III ed., Russell & Russell, New York 1973, p. 291. According to the Austrian 
scholar it is direct democracy that "represents the comparatively highest degree" o f the 
ideal type of democracy (ibid., p. 288).




























































































are a power, and a recurrent power, of nomination. This makes all the 
difference, for whoever holds the power to confirm a leader or not at 
definite dates maintains continuous power over him"58. More recently, by 
contrast, Professor Pizzorno has denounced the illusion that democracy 
guarantees "freedom of choice of policies", seeing its merit instead in the 
fact of allowing the "freedom of collective identifications"59.
Recapitulating, the democratic political system is basically made up of 
three elements: (i) the democratic method (political representation and 
majority principle) for the formation and functioning of the institution 
intended to produce the laws; (ii) the division of the State's constitutional 
powers; (iii) the civic freedoms guaranteed to the citizens. As we have 
said, the democratic method (understood as the combination of the 
majority principle and representation) is effective, in almost all democratic 
political systems, only in relation to one third of the total constitutional 
territory. We have further seen how political representation may be 
resolved into an unconditional, indiscriminate transfer of the will of one 
subject to another subject: a transfer that the claimed identity (or 
representation) of interests between representative and the represented 
cannot suffice to distinguish from an institutional relationship of 
hierarchy. The "superior" differs from the "representative" only when the 
latter is presented as interpreter of the will of his "inferior". Not every 
"superior" is ideologically presented as representing the will of his 
"inferiors”; and the "representative" (in the relationship modelled by
58 Ibid., p. 574.
59 See A. PIZZORNO, Le radici della politica assoluta e altri saggi, Feltrinelli, 




























































































political representation, as present in today's democratic States) is often a 
sort of "superior" in relation to his electors.
One of the most frequent ideological justifications for the hierarchical 
relationship makes use of the argument that the "superior" interprets 
(defends) the interests of the "inferior", even in the absence of an explicit, 
express fiduciary relationship. Not even Fiihrerschaft does without this 
legitimation, basing it on the exceptional qualities of the "leader", his 
"personality", but not forgetting to stress that he "interprets" and 
"represents" the interests of the Gefolgschaft, of the masses60. So-called 
"organic" representation may calmly exclude any electoral link whatever 
between "the representative" and "the represented" or an explicit will of 
the "represented". Biscaretti di Ruffia defines political representation as 
"representation of general interests"6!, excluding the possibility of its 
being seen as representation of will. This is barred by the prohibition of 
the binding mandate, of the mandat impératif, by which the representative 
would be bound by the instruction of his electors, and thus the genericity 
(generality) of the subject represented. If, then, "organic representation" 
and "representation of general interests” differ because of the presence, in
60 On the relationship between the charismatic leader, the Fiihrer, and his people, 
see the fine pages o f T. MANN, Mario und der Zauberer. Ein tragisches Reiseerlebnis, in 
idem, Die Erzdhlungen, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1986, especially p. 831.
6 ! "Political representation takes the shape of [...] 'total, generic representation of 
the most disparate interests o f an individual collectivity' and accordingly o f  a 
representation of general interests, o f political ones (ROMANO): and the political 
responsibility it determines comes into play only at the time the Chamber is dissolved, 
when the members of the collectivity represented may, when re-electing it, judge whether 
the aforesaid representative task has been satisfactorily performed by their parlamentarians 




























































































the latter's structure, of an electoral mechanism, they are fairly similar in 
the place they give to the actual will of the "represented". The relation 
between "superior" and "representative" may be that of genus ad speciem, 
if the "representative" is conceived of as a "superior” periodically 
subjected to "political responsibility" (that is, to the response of the 
electorate).
The concept of political responsibility deserves a few more words, 
since given the impossibility of demonstrating a real correspondence of 
will between "representative" and "represented", it supplies the ideological 
justification of political representation. The citizen, it is maintained, has 
the possibility of "judging" the work of the parlamentarian on whom he 
has conferred his trust through the vote, by reconfirming or denying it at 
the new elections. However, a section of constitutionalist thinkers is 
doubtful about the notion of political responsibility at least where the stress 
is on the noun; political responsibility could thus hardly be seen as legal 
institutional responsibility. If instead we put the stress on the adjective, 
responsibility might be seen as the effect of the relation existing between 
"politicians" and "public opinion", so that what they do interacts with what 
it decides; which is in an extrainstitutional context, completely freed of the 
electoral tie between "representative" and "represented".
Some distinguish between "diffuse" and "institutional" political 
responsibility. While the former (diffuse) type of responsibility is 
regarded as an actually existing factual datum, in relation however not just 
to voters but also non-voters, the second type of political responsibility 
(institutional) is said not to be found in most Western democratic States, 




























































































re-election to be regarded as a sanction on behaviour found not to comply 
with the duties of the elected representative, thus taking the shape of a kind 
of judgment of political responsibility, at least two conditions would have 
to be met: that the subject elected as parlamentarian be obliged to stand 
again at the next elections; that any re-election be institutionally subjected 
(according to institutionalized procedures) to an assessment of a political 
nature. Since these two conditions are not met, "institutional" political 
responsibility is not manifested. The only political responsibility actually 
in being remains "diffuse" political responsibility, which can however be 
called "responsibility" only in an improper sense62.
There has also been talk, in connection with political responsibility, of 
"representation-substitution" (designation of the able in place of the 
unable), and it has been observed that in the representative system 
consensus does not "preexist" but "follow"; that the elector does not "act" 
but "react", and that political initiative runs from the top down, not the 
other way round. The case is, then, that the very theory of "political 
responsibility" (a refined legal version of the idea of posterior consent to 
the will of the "representative") ends up in a hierarchical conception of 
political representation in which the relation between "representative" and 
"represented" has a downward rather than upward direction63.
As far as the majority principle goes, it is mostly based, legally (and 
logically), on a fiction: the majority prevails by becoming a totality. The
62 See G.U. RESCIGNO, La responsabilità politica, Giuffrè, Milan 1967, 
especially pp. 103 ff.
63 See V. MURA, Rappresentanza politica, in II Mondo Contemporaneo, voi. 9: 




























































































majority pretends to be no longer a part, but the whole; in consequence, 
the other part, the minority, disappears, is de jure eliminated64. The 
majority-minority relation too can thus follow the path of the hierarchical 
relation. As has been remarked, "in the majority principle one often sees 
rather than a principle of democracy, a principle which, on the contrary, 
legitimates a legal form of violence: the violence of the number, the 
majority's overpower on minorities"65.
It cannot be forgotten that the majority principle can without 
contradiction be used against fundamental rights. "A legally unrestricted 
majority rule", writes Hannah Arendt, "that is, a democracy a
constitution, can be very formidable in the suppression of the rights of 
minorities and very effective in the suffocation of dissent without any use
64 "Having banned all research into its political advisability and moral value, the 
Romans were concerned first and foremost with giving it [the majority principle] a legally 
exact formulation, by classifying it within the framework o f legal phenomena. The 
jurisconsults managed this through the following legal fiction: what the majority has done 
has to be regarded as if  it had been done by all. "Refertur ad universus quod publice fit per 
majorem partem" (Ulpian). "Quod maior pars curiae efficit, pro eo habctur ac si omnes 
egerint" (Scaevola). There is thus no legal bond between majority and minority. The 
objective law recognises only the former; accordingly, the majority is all, the minority 
nothing. The Romans' was the first, perhaps the only, decisive word ever said on the 
majority principle. Their fiction was to have its greatest fortune in the Middle Ages. But 
even today legal thought has not gone much further" (E. RUFFINI, 11 principio 
maggioritario (profilo storico), Adelphi, Milano 1976, pp. 21-22). At the end of his work 
Ruffini writes that "from a substantive viewpoint and at a deeper level", the principle 
supremely incompatible with the majority principle is that of hierarchy.
65 G. GALGANO, Problemi storici e attuali del principio maggioritario, in "Annali 




























































































of violence"66. Ronald Dworkin, among others, defends the crucial idea 
that democracy is not the same thing as the majority principle, and the 
position that in a real democracy freedom and minorities are legally 
protected in the form of a written constitution that not even Parliament can 
amend to adapt it to its whim and its policies67. Equally, in the sphere of 
private law the majority principle comes into a collision course with the 
fundamental principle of private autonomy: "it is presented as what 
subjects some individuals to the will of others in a system borne up by the 
principle that no one can be bound except by his own will; it attributes to 
the unilateral declaration of certain individuals binding efficacy upon 
others, in a system in which declarations of will do not produce effects for 
third parties"68.
There is thus a perception in several quarters of a misfit, or even 
tension, between the two elements making up the democratic system. 
Representation and majority principle on the one hand, and rights on the 
other, are bound to look at each other with mutual suspicion. The tension 
between rights on the one hand and institutional democratic apparatus on 
the other is also at the origin of certain recent communitarian proposals. 
"As bearers of rights", writes Michael Sandel, "where rights are trumps, 
we think of ourselves as freely choosing, individual selves, unbound by 
obligations antecedent to rights, or to the agreements we make. And yet, as
66 H. ARENDT, On Violence, now in idem, Crises o f the Republic, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth 1973, p. 111.
67 See R. DWORKIN, A Bill o f Rights for Britain, Chatto & Windus, London 
1990, p. 13.
68 F. GALGANO, Principio di maggioranza, in "Materiali per una storia della 




























































































citizens of the procedural republic that secure these rights, we find 
ourselves implicated willy-nilly in a formidable array of independencies 
and expectation we did not choose and increasingly reject"69. The trouble 
is, though, that such observations lead to an undervaluation of rights in 
favour of duties, and in the materialization, and so to speak moralization, 
of the latter from duties towards the law into obligations towards the 
community, the latter being seen as the source of the subject's "real" 
identity70.
The division of powers, always imperfect though it be, is an "effect" 
(and not a "cause") of the constitution of the modern democratic State, and 
does not call its unity or its nature into question, even though it may 
contribute to developing corporative dynamics: these do not by themselves 
imply any liberal potential. The division of powers in constitutional theory 
is completely internal to the modern State form turning round the notion 
of sovereignty; it is located within the hierarchical relationship between 
political society and civil society, subordinating the latter to the former. 
Dividing a power unchanged in attributions and qualities does not 
necessarily mean changing its quality. As for the law (positive State law), 
so also for power, it is not enough to multiply (even to infinity) the 
subjects who produce the former or hold the latter, in order to change its 
meaning and nature.
Civic freedoms, the most interesting and "progressive" element in the 
political and legal structure of the democratic State, become operational in
69 M. SANDEL, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self in "Political 
Theory", 1984, p. 94.




























































































practice to the extent that they are filled with the substance of citizens' 
action and become a weapon in the individual's libertarian striving. 
Democracy also means "turbulence"71, that is, a political system not 
closed in on itself but instead open to demands coming from society, aware 
of the risk of instability that may involve: a social structure ready to call in 
question its own criteria of justice and of redistribution of wealth. There is 
an unbreakable nexus — as John Rawls has forcibly emphasized — between 
democracy and "well-ordered", thatis,y«.sr society.
In short, the concept of democracy is strongly normative: any 
descriptive viewpoint about it ends up not understanding its scope, and, if 
taken seriously, risks denaturing it72. As Giovanni Sartori well puts it, 
"the descriptive viewpoint leads to definitions that have little or no 
resemblance to the normative definitions of democracy. The description of 
what democracy is in the real world is almost never oriented to the notion 
of the people"73. That is why so many political scientists and sociologists 
are embarassed about the concept, and seek stubbornly to reduce it to 
something else: to a system of élites, to polyarchy, to competition. There is 
similar embarassment about the concept of fundamental rights: these are 
reinterpreted as mere inputs of decisional procedures, or as instruments 
for implementing institutional decisions (for allocating economic goods, 
for instance). But democracy is above all else a normative ideal:
71 Cf. A. CAFFI, Cristianesmo e ellenismo, in "Tempo presente", maggio 1958, p. 
358. A similar interpretation of democracy is offered by Claude Lefort when he praises 
"the force of subversion of the established order" inherent in democratic systems (see C. 
LEFORT, L'invention démocratique, Fayard, Pairs 1981, p. 24).
72 See J. HABERMAS, Faktizitat und Celtung, cit., chap. 8.
73 G. SARTORI, Democrazia e definizioni, III ed., II Mulino, Bologna 1972, p. 




























































































government by the people74. And fundamental rights turn around a moral 
concept: that of the human person. Without this ideal reference, 
democratic systems lose their meaning, their "idée directrice", and are 
condemned to decadence. Rules and procedures, though fundamental, are 
not enough to define, or to give us, democracy. What is further needed is a 
"meaning" to guide and give content to those rules and those procedures.
Democracy amounts to very little if it is equivalent to multilateral 
checks and balances between powers, leading to a system of mutual 
institutional conditioning among the constitutional organs of the State: the 
system of "weights and counterweights" that prevents any organ, whatever 
its constitutional position, from being decisively elevated over all the 
rest75. On this understanding of democracy, civil liberties have a marginal 
role: they do not act autonomously, but appear and are comprised within
74 Suggestively enough it is the normative ideal o f people's self-government the 
main target o f Domenico Settembrini's criticism. This centers around the argument that 
prescribing people's self-government is a supreme form o f contempt towards the people 
who do not have any intendon (and capacity) to govern themselves. All those - so runs the 
argument - who defend a concept o f democracy as the people's self-government do not 
accept people as they actually are (see D. SETTEMBRINI, Democrazia senza illusioni, 
Laterza, Bari 1994, pp. 67 ff). According to the Italian scholar democracy cannot go 
beyond some kind of oligarchy, since the people as such are not capable o f managing 
directly or indirectly public (their own) affairs. In short, according to Settembrini 
democracy is only one form more of political command and does not represent in the least 
a manner to overcome political subordination. But the problem with this idea is that 
democracy, both in its direct and representative form, is based on one fundamental 
assumption: that people are "competent" to deliberate on public affairs. As has been 
pointed out by Robert Dahl, once this assumption is rejected, democracy gives way to 
guardianship  (see R. DAHL, Controlling Nuclear Weapons. Democracy versus 
Guardianship, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y. 1981, chap. 1).




























































































the interval of the swing of the pendulum between the powers. Democracy 
instead becomes very relevant if instead of being only a theory of a 
political form it becomes a theory of civil rights. In the first case, civil 
liberties find their justification in the spaces left open by mutually jealous, 
suspicious powers; in the second, they no longer assume instrumental 
value, and are what determines the patterns and changes of political forms. 
The basic rule for this substantive normative conception of democracy lies 
in the metalegal principles of the Constitution, not in the compromise 
reached by the State's powers.
6. Democracy and Tensions: Some Conclusions
It may be said that the democratic system in general, by comparison 
with its foundation myth (people's self-government) and the underlying 
normative ideal (the "freedom" mentioned at the outset, that is, individual 
autonomy understood as a universalizable principle) shows a number of 
shortcomings and tensions. The first tension arises within the dynamic 
between representation and popular (and individual) will. There is here a 
certain gap that does not allow full equivalence between the will of the 
represented (which is sometimes even not there) and the will or action of 
the representative. This happens irrespective of adoption of a model of 
representation as Vertretung (conventional, and hence more open to 
influence from the represented) or as Representation (which may instead 
be close to authoritarian and totalitarian conceptions, justifying the 




























































































Another continuous source of tension is the majority principle, as far 
as its use as a method of collective decision goes, since this principle may 
end by wiping out the will of minorities, thus vanifying the aspiration to 
full popular sovereignty (which should include the will of "all"). Between 
"general will" and "will of all" there is no equivalence. Yet the "general 
will" aspires to become or to be justifiedly be considered as the "will of 
all", and is ultimately justified only thanks to this aspiration.
Then comes the separation of powers. Here too there are several 
reasons for tensions. One should in particular point to the fact that the 
functional division of power often serves to justify the inapplicability of 
the democratic method to certain "regions" of the political institutions. 
There is thus ground for conflict between the division of powers and a 
consistent, or if you will rad ica l, application of the democratic method. In 
particular, there is a tension between the idea of the division of powers and 
the role given to legislation as the seat of people's self-determination.
But it is the very principle of popular sovereignty that is, so to speak, 
at risk, in the sense that it may be more or less easily twisted into 
justifying illiberal behaviour. Above all, for popular sovereignty to be 
fully exercised, there is a need for active participation in political life by 
the greatest possible number of citizens. To secure such participation, 
"republican" virtues need to be cultivated, constant attention to the 
common wealth should be stimulated, and a sort of "mobilization" aimed at 
the administration and discussion of public affairs. But this sort of 
"mobilization", quite apart from the difficulty of realizing it, may conflict 
with the possible legitimate desire to "keep out", the indiduals' need for 




























































































paternalist stance could be adopted to bring about and strenghten 
"republican" virtues among citizens. But paternalism often conflicts with 
individual autonomy, and democracy as people's self-determination is 
nothing more than the universalization of individual autonomy.
Then comes the problem of the necessary material conditions for 
democracy. For a people actually to exercise its sovereignty, they must be 
already "sovereign" de facto, that is, not economically and culturally 
dependent on other overlying powers, and moreover morally integral and 
prepared to treat public affairs as questions of general interest to which the 
principle of universalizability applies. A "democratic" people is one that 
knows how to distinguish instrumental or strategic rationality from 
communicative rationality, and regards the main province of the latter as 
politics. A "prudential", "economistic" or "realistic" vision of politics is at 
bottom incompatible with the democratic administration of public affairs. 
"Representative institutions", wrote John Stuart Mill over a century ago, 
"are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny and intrigue, 
when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own 
government to give their vote, or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their 
suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck 
of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they 
desire to propitiate"76. Democracy is in short possible only where the civic 
conscience and public freedoms are already strong and flourishing.
There is still more than one possibility of tension between the popular 
will (even if unanimous) and certain principles and rights that do not




























































































derive either their justification or their (howbeit limited) binding force 
from that will.
This tension may also take the shape of conflict between "people" and 
"constitution", that is, the body of formal and/or material rules and 
principles that underlie that given political community. There may, that is, 
be conflict between democracy as society supported on a constitution (by 
principles and rules endowed with superior dignity and force to those 
enjoyed by the ordinary laws issued by the organs of popular sovereignty) 
and democracy as government by the people. This tension may take the 
form of a conflict of powers between the legislative and the judicial 
power, between the "people's representative" and the "guardian of the 
constitution" (which in systems with "rigid" constitutions is today 
generally the judge, whether constitutional or ordinary)77.
Because of a paradox common to various forms of extreme 
voluntarism or "libertarianism” (to make it clear, of the type of those 
represented by such American thinkers as Ayn Rand), the exaltation of 
will, that is, an "autopoietic" or self-founding justification of both 
individual liberty and the popular will, may lead to situations of 
annihilation of that very will. If I am absolutely free to do what I want 
with myself, then I can also make myself a slave. If the people is absolutely
77 For a critical discussion of "judicialist" tendencies, with particular reference to 
U.S. experience, see the excellent article by M. WALZER, Philosophy and Democracy, in 
"Political Theory", 1980. Cf. also the recent important contribution by B. 
ACKERM ANN, We the People, Vol. 1, Foundations, Harvard University Press, 





























































































sovereign, it may decide to give itself a dictator. In both cases, for radical 
voluntarism, there is no ground for objections. This reminds us that both 
individual freedom and democracy presuppose, and refer back to, a body 
of principles to which freedom itself and sovereignty itself (as individual 
and collective will respectively) can (justifiably) do nothing. This most 
notably means a series of rights the breach of which — even with conscious 
assent by those concerned — would constitute a morally unacceptable 
situation; and breach of which by a given political regime — even with the 
unanimous consent of the citizens -  would indicate the illiberal nature of 
that regime. In democracy "substance", people's government, is often a 
matter of "form", when not of procedure78.
78 Cf. Habermas' plea for a procedural concept o f  democracy (J. HABERMAS, 
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